The Iranian revolution was not "Islamic" and "Islamist" forces who took over needed pseudo crises to implement their agenda. The "hostage crisis" was the first and "nuclear policy" is the latest of such crises that portray "Iran vs. the world." The other side, the US and some regional powers, too, welcome such a "bogeyman" role by Iran. This scheme, due to its economic and political costs could not continue further. Besides, the Obama administration intends to rely on diplomacy to resolve the issue. This has created a real opportunity for Iran to become a normal member of global community. Many forces such as neo-cons in the US, some regional powers, and hardliners in Iran are opposed to this normalization. Benefits of normalization, however, are enormous. Therefore Iranian negotiators must be flexible. This makes their task difficult but not impossible.
The, deal, if reached, is a first step in bring back IRI from a pariah state into a normal member of the global community. This makes neocons and all those in favor of a more militaristic foreign policy in the US nervous because they lose a good "excuse." The same is true for BB Netanyahu and the extreme right in Israel that will be denied this "existential threat." The hardliners in Saudi Arabia and other regional countries will not be happy either. Russia and China, too, will lose an economic bonanza, and an occasion to demand favor from US and its allies in return for using their leverage to keep IRI from causing trouble. Hardliners in Iran, those who still dream of "exporting Islamic revolution" are very much opposed to this deal also. In short, it seems everybody loses from IRI stopping to be a bogeyman.
Who benefits? As was said If IRI leaders decide to make Iran's national interest, rather than their own internal and external "Islamization" agenda, top priority, they will find out that a normal relation with the US benefits both countries. Iran and the US share many common interests. Some, such as support for Iraqi and Afghani governments, or fighting against ISIS and Taliban, are obvious and publicized. Less publicized is the daily contact and cooperation between Iranian and US navies in the Persian Gulf. This is a shallow body of warm water full of marine life. If one of the giant oil tanker carrying hundreds of thousand tons of crude oil is sunk in it (something that terrorist groups must be dreaming of everyday) an environmental catastrophe is in hand. For years that has not happened, thanks to the coordination between the two navies.
Major challenges to Iran's national interests do not come from the US, Israel, or Saudi Arabia. They come from the north. Despite being the largest country of the world, Russia does not have practical and unimpeded access to open waters. Tsari Russia's quest for "warm waters" has resulted in cession of big chunks of Persian Empire in the past two centuries. Except for a brief period under Lenin, the quest seemed to have continued in the Soviet Union. During the WWII Iran was invaded from the south by the US and UK, and from the north by Soviet Union. They used Iran's facilities, its railroad in particular, to send supplies to Eastern fronts and successfully stop the Nazi army from further expansion. This was so crucial that Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin dubbed Iran "bridge to victory" in their 1943 meeting in Tehran. After the war was over, Stalin refused to pull troops from northern Iran. One of the earliest cases the newly found United Nations had to deal with was Iran's complaint against the Soviet Union. The USA pressure on Stalin was helpful in the eventual withdrawal of Soviet forces.
After the collapse of Soviet Union things have changed, not necessarily for better. Caspian Sea, the largest lake in the world, is full of resources. Other than oil and gas its caviar is famous. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was controlled half and half by Iran and the Soviet Union. Now there are five countries there; and they dispute Iran's claim to half or much water beyond its coast. The legal status of Caspian see is in limbo. Iran needs all the help that it can get in any relevant International organization or arena dealing with this issue.
Another major challenge with huge upsides for Iran relates to the newly independent Asian republics of Soviet Union. These republics would welcome the presence of the U.S. in the region as a counterpart to the heavy influence of Russia and increasingly China. These are land-locked countries. The shortest, easiest (mostly flat terrain) way to access the rest of world is via Iran with its numerous roads and railroads.
The biggest benefits of this rapprochement for Iran and the rest of the world are in the realm of economics. Iran is a country of 75 million mostly young people with an above average for the region acquired taste for modern products and services. Its labor force, too, is higher than average in terms of education and dexterity. Thirty five years of various sanctions have made Iran in dire need of modern technology. It also has one of the lowest foreign debt ratios in the world, another consequence of the sanctions.
To this one should be added Iran's potential as a hub for access to several central Asian countries. Iran is the best transit route for exports, mostly oil and natural gas and minerals, of these to the rest of the world. All of these create potentials for hundreds of billions of dollar of investment and millions of high paying jobs for a country that is suffering from double digit unemployment.
What to do?
The "nuclear enrichment policy" of IRI has cost more than $150 billion dollars directly, and nearly $700 billion indirectly (in terms of forgone opportunities) with next to nothing in benefits so far. The potential benefits of the rapprochement for great majority of Iranian people, and the rest of the world, are so much to justify extensive flexibility and compromises by all sides. Indeed, due to so much opposition to the deal there have to be strong determinations amongst negotiators. On the US side, president Obama and Secretary of State Kerry so far have shown required toughness to overcome neo-cons, pro-Israeli lobby, and GCC objections. Still there is a long way to go to convince the skeptical public and media in the US. This "holding our nose" approach of the Obama administration towards the deal is not very helpful. While it is important to point out negative consequences of no deal and lack of a viable alternative if negotiations fail, they must also emphasis, a la Cuban case, some of the positives of the deal that the U.S. government and businesses will benefit from. Additionally, the U.S. should be more vocal aginst to negative statements, bordering racism, made on "Iranians" by the likes of Benjamin Netanyahu and senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina.
Iranian negotiators have a more crucial role. They have to convince their neighbors in the south that Iran's return to the fold is positive and beneficial to them. They should start by taking a more friendly posture. For example, they could have invited Saudi Arabia (and Turkey) to the negotiations. If Germany gets to sit at the table, why shouldn't Saudis and Turks? While convincing Netanyahu may be impossible, conciliatory comments toward Israel and Jews will help the center and left of Israeli politics to be less concerned. By making it clear that they are opposed to Shia extremists as well as Sunni ones, and do not intend to export a Shia revolution, the IRI leaders may calm down Sunnis in the region. Besides, pointing out potential for future investment to their rich southern neighbors will help. All of these elements make Iranian negotiators' role crucial and difficult. Do the IRI leaders in Tehran want to, and if yes, can they pull this off? It is clear that a great majority of Iranian people want the deal. It is also safe to assume the Rouhani administration wants to deliver and bring back IRI to the global community, maybe with some ifs and buts and reservations. Those who oppose, however small in number, are very powerful. There are many political centers in Tehran, some more powerful than the Rouhani administration. Everybody knows about the Supreme Leaser and his "House" that is for all practical purposes a state within the state and more influential than the government. The Revolutionary Guards and security apparatus, too, are very powerful. So are institutions controlled by the conservative clergy. In all of these institutions there are elements opposed to the deal. Although this is not to say these institutions are solidly opposed to a deal. More problematic is the fact that those opposed to the deal do not argue their cases based on rational economic and political cost-benefit analysis. They are in this messianic mind-set that considers any rapprochement and compromise as betrayal of the revolution and martyrs. They claim, and probably are willing to, shed blood, including their own. They have a lot to lose materially and mentally. Rouhani-Zarif must win the cultural war against this opposition. It is very difficult but seems the only way. But again, if anyone can pull this out, Rouhani would be it. A clergy who got his PhD in Law from a Scottish university, and has extensive background work within the security apparatus, he led Iranian negotiating team under Khatami. That was the last time that IRI made meaningful concessions.
A shorter version of this paper was presented at the Left Forum 2015 last month in New York.
Thanks to the author for sending this to Portside
G. Reza Ghorashi is Professor of Economics and Coordinator of GSM, Stockton University, 101 Vera King Farris Dr., Galloway NJ 08205
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