Portside

After the Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961, President John F. Kennedy called the man he defeated in the 1960 election, Richard Nixon, to commiserate about the unique burden of the presidency. “It really is true that foreign affairs is the only important issue for a president to handle, isn’t it?” the rattled young JFK said to the former vice president. “I mean, who gives a shit if the minimum wage is $1.15 or $1.25, in comparison to something like this?”

Kennedy, like other presidents, faced the painful truth that the challenges of foreign policy in the nuclear age fall to the commander in chief alone. Today, India and Pakistan are inching closer to a war that could have catastrophic implications for their region and the world. Is the Trump administration willing, and competent enough, to help keep the peace?

It is in America’s interest to prevent a larger conflict, which would be a diplomatic and humanitarian disaster on multiple levels even without the introduction of nuclear weapons. The possibility of a nuclear exchange, however, is so terrible that it is in a category of its own. Even if the use of nuclear arms were contained to the two warring nations, the disruption—and radioactive fallout—would spread across the region, and eventually make its way to American shores. The Indians and the Pakistanis might yet exercise restraint, as nuclear powers historically do even when angered. But in the meantime, we must hope that the administration, which so far seems obsessed only with political revenge, culture wars, and indulging the president’s pet economic theories, can rise to this occasion.

The escalation of tensions between two nuclear-armed powers is a severe international crisis. How does the executive branch usually function at such moments?

American presidential administrations have various interagency tools and processes that help the executive branch navigate its way through high danger, short timelines, and conflicting information. The national security adviser usually coordinates inputs from the State and Defense Departments, pulls information from the National Security Council’s various experts, and works to get timely information from the intelligence community. The president and other senior officials often reach out through formal—and, sometimes more important, informal—channels to allies and others.

It is possible that all of this is happening right now in the White House. Perhaps President Donald Trump is meeting with National Security Adviser Marco Rubio, who in turn is handling meetings with and contributions from administration leaders such as … well, Secretary of State Marco Rubio. And maybe Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard are working hand in glove with other top National Security Council members to provide Trump with solid options for approaching the nations (as well as other interested parties) and de-escalating a potentially existential crisis.

To paraphrase a famous Ernest Hemingway line, it would be pretty to think so. Trump, at least judging by his answer to a reporter’s question yesterday, seems unaware of what’s going on or what’s at stake. “It’s a shame,” Trump said, drawing on the kinds of stock phrases he employs when he’s confronted with information he seems to not fully grasp. He went on, “I guess people knew something was going to happen based on a little bit of the past. They’ve been fighting for a long time, you know? They’ve been fighting for many, many decades, and centuries, actually, if you really think about it. No, I just hope it ends very quickly.” You can think about it all day, but India and Pakistan—two countries that were not independent until 1947—have not been fighting “for centuries.”

Fittingly, Trump made his remarks during a swearing-in ceremony for the amateur diplomat Steve Witkoff as his special envoy to the Middle East. Witkoff, a real-estate mogul with no foreign-policy experience, has already fumbled his informal dabbling in negotiations with Russia about Ukraine.

Likewise, it is improbable that Hegseth and Gabbard are up to the job of handling a major crisis. Gabbard, in particular, seemed in over her head even during her confirmation hearings; she has since been at odds with her intelligence community on issues such as Venezuela. Hegseth’s Pentagon, according to former senior staffers—people hired by Hegseth—is a mess. (Hegseth, of course, could be getting up to speed by convening a Signal meeting with his wife and family members as we speak.) Other administration officials, such as CIA Director John Ratcliffe, are so far nowhere to be seen. United Nations Ambassador-Designate Mike Waltz has not yet been confirmed, but his position in Turtle Bay once he arrives will be weak: Every diplomat at the UN knows that Waltz was exiled to New York from the White House.

To his credit, however, the dual-hatted Rubio does seem busy. (Rubio is the only person besides Henry Kissinger to have ever run the National Security Council and State Department simultaneously, and it is both a criticism and a compliment to say that Marco Rubio is no Henry Kissinger.) So far, Rubio has reached out to the Pakistani prime minister and the Indian external affairs minister in an effort to lessen tensions; he has also engaged with both country’s national security advisers. Rubio’s job is complicated by the fact that Pakistan’s main military patron is China; this crisis could strengthen Beijing’s influence in the region, which would be to America’s detriment.

Every American, and anyone who cares about global peace, should wish Rubio well and hope for his success. Americans often have difficulty seeing the links between far-off conflicts and their own well-being, but experienced diplomats know that the ripples of military and economic instability can have drastic effects not only on the physical security of the United States, but on the daily standard of living at home. (This reality is why, for example, President Bill Clinton worked frantically, and successfully, to avert a nuclear showdown between India and Pakistan during the Kargil conflict in 1999.)

In the 1990 gangster film Miller’s Crossing, a mob lieutenant cautions his boss about underestimating the danger from other gangs. When the top man says not to worry, the lieutenant answers: “I’d worry a lot less if I thought you were worrying enough.” We must hope that the administration is worrying enough; at least Rubio, for his part, seems engaged. But it would be more reassuring to see the administration focus far less on its internal grievances (and insulting our allies), and more on keeping the nuclear peace.

Tom Nichols is a staff writer at The Atlantic and a contributor to the Atlantic Daily newsletter.