Portside

“Can we say this is the greatest victory in the history of the State of Israel?” This is what a host on Israel’s Channel 12 asked retired Israeli army General Giora Eiland — father of the so-called “Generals’ Plan” to starve and ethnically cleanse Gaza’s northernmost cities — some two hours after the ceasefire between Israel and Iran took effect on June 24. Eiland was modest. The victory in the 1967 war was bigger, he reassured the anchor, but this was certainly a tremendous achievement.

As someone old enough to remember the euphoria following the 1967 war, I can’t deny the echoes between the Six-Day War and this “12-Day War” with Iran: the same collective relief that a perceived existential threat was supposedly eliminated, the same disdain and mockery directed at the enemy’s performance, the same overwhelming pride in Israel’s military prowess — paired with the belief that such a victory secures the country’s future for decades to come.

But as history reminds us, the war of June 1967 wasn’t Israel’s last. Far from it. In many ways, it marked the beginning of a new era of bloodshed. The current war in Gaza, and perhaps the war with Iran as well, can be seen as a direct continuation of that “glorious triumph.”

It took years after 1967 for Israelis to grasp that the war hadn’t ushered in the transformation they had hoped for. This time, the disillusionment set in almost immediately. Mere hours after U.S. President Donald Trump abruptly announced the ceasefire, it was already apparent that victory over Iran was unlikely to end Israel’s conflict with the Islamic Republic, let alone all of its future wars.

In the early hours of Sunday morning, right after the U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear sites, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared, “I promised you that Iran’s nuclear facilities would be destroyed, one way or another. That promise has been fulfilled.” In a televised address, Trump echoed that sentiment, claiming the sites were “totally obliterated” in the Saturday night airstrike. 

The Iranians, meanwhile, countered that they had removed most of the enriched uranium from Fordow before the attack, while a CNN report citing U.S. intelligence sources revealed that the strike had likely delayed Iran’s nuclear program by “a few months” at best. Given that the war’s stated goal was to eliminate the immediate threat of an Iranian bomb — and that U.S. intelligence never believed Iran was close to producing one — it’s hard to argue this goal was achieved.

The ‘bitter taste’ of war

Another question mark hangs over the war’s impact on Israel’s deterrence in the Middle East. On one hand, Israel’s military clearly demonstrated overwhelming superiority: it flew over Iranian airspace unimpeded, possessed precise intelligence on the whereabouts of senior Iranian defense officials and nuclear scientists, and carried out targeted strikes with remarkable accuracy. Its operational and technological capabilities were on full display. 

Israel also proved that it can act as the region’s neighborhood bully — disregarding international law, bypassing ongoing negotiations between Iran and the Trump administration — while continuing to enjoy unwavering support from the West, especially from Washington.

But while Netanyahu’s success in drawing the United States into a war he initiated undoubtedly bolstered Israel’s image as a regional power, it would be a mistake to overlook the degree of deterrence Iran managed to establish.

Since 1948, Israel’s major cities have never faced the kind of sustained threat experienced during this war: multiple buildings reduced to rubble; 25 more slated for demolition due to structural damage; 29 Israeli civilians killed; nearly 10,000 people left homeless; over 40,000 compensation claims filed with the property tax authority; city streets emptied; and economic activity grinding to a halt. October 7 was horrifying, but it was largely perceived by Israelis as a singular catastrophe. The 12-day war with Iran, however, chipped away at their long-held sense of security. Millions felt that immunity begin to crack.

Iran demonstrated that despite Israel’s cutting-edge defenses, its home front is still vulnerable. Images of destruction from Tel Aviv, Bat Yam, and Be’er Sheva resembled scenes from Gaza — and they were widely circulated across the region, even by those who don’t necessarily support the Iranian regime. Even if most Israelis feel the suffering was “worth the price” of dealing a major blow to Iran, the constant scramble to shelters, sleepless nights, and daily disorientation left a lasting psychological toll. Should conflict reignite, Israelis are unlikely to approach it with the same composure.

It’s clear Netanyahu and the Israeli leadership were not seeking a drawn-out confrontation with Iran — precisely because it would undercut the narrative of “total victory” that dominated the early days of the campaign. That likely explains why, immediately after the U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear sites, most Israeli commentators and analysts began speaking of “wrapping up the story” within days.

Yet even in this limited 12-day confrontation, Israel did not accomplish its stated goals. At a press conference shortly after the offensive began, Netanyahu set out three objectives: dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, eliminate its ballistic missile capabilities, and sever its support for the “axis of terror.” Defense Minister Israel Katz went even further, stating one of Israel’s goals was to assassinate Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — effectively, to trigger regime change.

That “endgame” goal wasn’t achieved. In fact, while the details of the Trump-Tehran ceasefire agreement remain murky, what’s clear is that none of Netanyahu’s three aims have been fulfilled. Iran is in no rush to return to nuclear talks, accusing Washington of duplicity by engaging in diplomacy while greenlighting Israeli strikes. No restrictions have been made on Iran’s expanding missile arsenal, which Israeli army Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir cited as the main reason for the “preemptive strike.” And there’s no reduction in Iranian support for its so-called “ring of fire” — the regional network of proxies encircling Israel.

If Israel has emerged as the superior military power, diplomatically, it appears to have gained little, if anything at all. That outcome shouldn’t be surprising: since the war in Gaza began, Netanyahu has largely abandoned efforts to set clear diplomatic goals for military action, relying instead on force as the sole instrument of policy, from Gaza and Lebanon to Syria and now Iran. 

This latest front has once again exposed the limits of that approach. From day one, Iran declared it would not negotiate under fire, demanding a ceasefire before any return to nuclear talks. Israel refused, and Netanyahu seemed to apply the same strategy that was previously reserved for Hamas: negotiations only under fire. Yet in the end, the ceasefire was declared without any (known) preconditions, exactly as Iran had demanded.

The gap between ambitious “objectives” and more elusive “achievements” is already sowing disappointment, at least on the Israeli right. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich described a “bitter taste” alongside the “decisive victory.” Benny Sabti, an Iranian-born Israeli analyst who has become a prominent voice on Israeli news panels during the war, tweeted that “a ceasefire amid ongoing rocket fire and fatalities is an irrational decision. Iran will emerge stronger.”

Even Netanyahu’s apparent diplomatic coup in drawing the U.S. military into an Israeli-initiated war is now being reassessed. Just days ago, it was hailed as a personal triumph for the Israeli premier, with lawmaker Aryeh Deri calling Trump “God’s messenger for the Jewish people.” But by relying on the United States to deliver the final blow at Fordow, Israel effectively ceded a degree of control, culminating in a clear reminder that Trump still had the last word. After Iran launched a missile three hours after the ceasefire, Israel sent warplanes to retaliate. But as they were already en route, Trump publicly warned Israel on his Truth Social account, “DO NOT DROP THOSE BOMBS,” forcing the planes to turn back.

A political restoration?

On the surface, Netanyahu appears to be the big winner of this war in Israel. Even his fiercest critics in the media have given him credit for the military success, to say nothing of his supporters, who have returned to speaking about him in near-divine terms. He himself seems reborn: giving interviews, visiting missile impact sites, eating falafel with the people — gestures he had all but abandoned since the launch of his judicial overhaul, and certainly since October 7. Unsurprisingly, speculation is already swirling in the media that he might call early elections to capitalize on his newfound glory.

But the polls published since Israel’s opening strike against Iran have been less encouraging for Netanyahu than one might expect. Likud has gained some ground, but the right-wing coalition bloc remains stuck at a projected 50 Knesset seats — not enough to prevent the opposition from forming a government. One possible explanation is that air force pilots and intelligence officers, the two groups perhaps most associated with the anti-Netanyahu protest movement, have emerged as the war’s true heroes. 

The main reason Netanyahu chose this moment to launch a war with Iran was to make Gaza fade from view: to make people forget his failure to eliminate Hamas; to forget the hostages that are still in captivity; to forget the mounting international outrage over the horrific images emanating from the Strip; to forget the growing domestic frustration with the war; and to forget that the monstrous plan to push Palestinians into southern Gaza in preparation for expulsion has stalled, accomplishing little beyond shooting at starving civilians waiting in line for food.

But now that the war with Iran is over, Gaza is once again impossible to ignore. Any Israeli who needed a reminder didn’t have to wait long: on June 25, seven soldiers were killed by an IED in Khan Yunis. And contrary to Netanyahu’s hopes, the pressure to end the war in Gaza is only likely to intensify.

Protesters march through the streets of Haifa calling for an end to Israel’s war on Gaza, May 31, 2025. (Yahel Gazit)

Even before the deadly incident in Khan Yunis, there was already a palpable sense of fatigue and despair among Israeli troops serving in Gaza, particularly reservists. The war with Iran may in fact reinforce a growing belief among Israelis that if the country can successfully confront a supposedly existential threat like Iran’s nuclear program, then it can certainly manage a far lesser challenge like Hamas, striking a deal to end the war in exchange for all the hostages. Indeed, the “Hostage and Missing Families Forum,” the main group representing the families of Israelis still held captive in Gaza, wasted no time in making the connection. “Anyone who can bring about a ceasefire with Iran can also end the war in Gaza,” it declared in a statement following the ceasefire.

It remains unclear whether Trump will now push to end the war in Gaza in order to bolster his image as a peacemaker. But if he does head in that direction, it will be far harder for Netanyahu to resist, especially after effectively handing Trump the keys to ending the war with Iran.

MAGA figurehead Steve Bannon’s furious outburst, calling Netanyahu a “brazen liar” for violating the Trump-brokered ceasefire, is an early warning sign. And European countries, many of which backed Israel during the Iran war out of an instinctive West-versus-East reflex, may now escalate their threats to sanction Israel unless it “ends the suffering” in Gaza, and perhaps even follow through on them.

For over 30 years, the “existential threat” from Iran — and the claim that only he could neutralize it — has been one of Netanyahu’s most powerful political cards. But now he’s played it. And it won’t be easy to play again. He cannot credibly claim in the near future that Iran is on the verge of building a bomb without undermining the very “decisive victory” he celebrated on live television.

That leaves the ethnic cleansing in Gaza and the annexation of the West Bank as Netanyahu’s remaining agenda. But politically, those are far weaker cards, especially if they stand alone without the looming specter of an Iranian “axis of evil.”

Without a strong card left to play, Netanyahu may come to see a comprehensive deal on Gaza — as recently floated by Gilad Erdan, former ambassador to Washington and longtime Netanyahu loyalist — as the most viable path forward: End the war, bring the hostages home (the few that are still alive), and go to elections riding the fumes of victory in Iran and pictures embracing the returning captives.